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Federal hazardous waste regulation and cleanup programs suffer from poor prioritization, 
insufficient flexibility, high costs, and questionable benefits.  Many of these problems are a 
result of excessive regulatory centralization.  With the enactment of the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Comprehensive Emergency Response, Cleanup and Liability Act 
(CERCLA, aka “Superfund”) Congress centralized environmental policy questions that are, in 
many respects, inherently local in nature.  This produced a “mismatch” between those 
jurisdictions with regulatory primacy and the nature of the environmental problems at issue. 
Contamination of soil and groundwater are site-specific, rarely crossing state lines.  Due to the 
local nature of hazardous waste problems, state governments should be given the opportunity to 
assume leadership of hazardous waste regulation and cleanup.  While the federal government has 
an important role to play in the regulation and management of hazardous wastes, this role 
requires more targeted and specialized efforts than the adoption and maintenance of a 
comprehensive cradle-to-grave regulatory system and a large scale waste site cleanup program 
that impose federal standards on local communities.  Through technical guidance federal 
agencies can inform local waste management and cleanup decisions without imposing uniform 
federal standards that fit few jurisdictions well.  With federal efforts confined to those areas in 
which the federal government possesses a comparative advantage, state governments will be 
freed to reassume leadership in hazardous waste policy and tailor state policies to local needs and 
concerns.  This, in turn, could foster greater recognition of and accountability for the trade-offs 
inherent in hazardous waste policy, and a more justifiable regulatory regime for hazardous waste. 
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REFORMING OUR WASTEFUL HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY 





 Federal hazardous waste regulation and cleanup programs suffer from poor prioritization, 
insufficient flexibility, high costs, and questionable benefits.  Many of these problems are a 
result of excessive regulatory centralization.  The federal government has assumed primary 
responsibility for hazardous waste policy, placing states in a secondary role, even though the 
environmental threats posed by hazardous waste are generally quite localized.  Hazardous waste 
itself is not a form of pollution, but rather a “precursor to pollution.”1  It only becomes an 
environmental problem when mismanaged, and allowed to contaminate land or water.  Properly 
managed, however, hazardous waste is not a particularly pressing environmental concern.  And 
when improperly handled, hazardous waste tends to create fairly localized environmental 
concerns.  Contamination of soil and groundwater are site-specific, rarely crossing state lines.  
Unlike much air and water pollution, mismanagement of hazardous waste does not involve 
                                                 
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law & Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School 
of Law.  This paper was prepared for the New York Law School-New York University School of Law project 
“Breaking the Logjam: An Environmental Law for the 21st Century.”  Thanks to Tai Antoine for her able research 
assistance, and to David Schoenbrod, Richard Stewart, Stephanie Tatham, and participants in the N.Y.U. School of 
Law Environmental Governance workshop and Breaking the Logjam Conference for comments and critiques.  Any 
errors, omissions, or wastefulness are solely the fault of the author.  
1 Hilary Sigman, Taxing Hazardous Waste: The U.S. Experience, 3 PUB. FIN. & MGMT. 12, 13 (2003). 
 
DRAFT – Not for Citation  Adler, Haz. Waste – Page 2 
 
 
substantial interstate externalities of the sort that would typically justify the imposition of federal 
regulation. 
State governments should be given the opportunity to assume leadership of hazardous 
waste regulation and cleanup.  While the federal government has an important role to play in the 
regulation and management of hazardous wastes, this role should be far more circumscribed and 
targeted than under existing law.  A more decentralized regulatory regime could produce more 
transparent and forthright accounting of the trade-offs inherent in hazardous waste management 
and cleanup, encourage the development of more targeted and location specific remedial 
measures, and foster a more effective hazardous waste policy for the future. 
 
 
I. FEDERAL HAZARDOUS WASTE LAWS 
 
National attention only turned to the environmental problems associated with hazardous 
waste well after the process of environmental policy centralization had begun.2  Prior to that 
point, federal efforts focused on the more visible problems of air and water pollution.3  The 
gradual nationalization of waste policy occurred with relatively little consideration of the proper 
roles of the federal and state governments in safeguarding the nation’s water and soil.  Fed by 
                                                 
2 For a brief overview of the federalization of environmental regulation, see Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of 
Federal Environmental Regulation, 55 CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 93 (2004). 
3 See Paul Weiland & Rosemary O’Leary, Federalism and Environmental Policy: The Case of Solid Waste 
Management, 27 AMER. REV. PUB. ADMN. 211, 213 (1997) ( “waste disposal was not recognized as an 
environmental problem until after air and water quality problems were recognized.”).  Somewhat ironically, air and 
water pollution control measures increased the waste disposal problem insofar as pollution controls increased the 
generation of wastes containing pollutants removed from air emissions and liquid effluent.  See MICHAEL B. 
GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN TOXIC AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 19-20 
(1994). 
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public hysteria, Congress adopted legislative programs with minimal discussion and debate.  The 
initial provisions governing hazardous waste contained in the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) 4 were largely an afterthought to the newly enacted federal solid waste 
law.5  Congress adopted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA, aka “Superfund”)6 during a lame-duck legislative session with minimal 
debate in response to the perceived “crisis” of abandoned waste sites.7 
With both RCRA and CERCLA, and subsequent legislative amendments, Congress 
centralized environmental policy questions that are, in many respects, inherently local in nature.  
This produced a “mismatch” between those jurisdictions with regulatory primacy and the nature 
of the environmental problems at issue.8  While federal legislators and agency officials were 
“contemptuous of the capacity of state and local governments” to address hazardous waste 
concerns, the legislation they adopted decreased state and local political responsibility and 
accountability, further compromising the development of sound hazardous waste policy.9  With 
Superfund in particular, “the design of the program did not seek to promote decentralization or to 
                                                 
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k. 
5 See MARK K. LANDY, MARC J. ROBERTS & STEPHEN R. THOMAS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: 
ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS – FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 93 (1994).  Only one of the sixteen legislative findings 
contained in the 1976 Act concerned hazardous waste, and it merely noted that such waste presents “special dangers 
to health and requires a greater degree of regulation than does non-hazardous solid waste.” Id.   
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. 
7 LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 164 (Congress “failed to deliberate about the basic strategic choices regarding 
program design and resource allocation” when passing Superfund). 
8 For an overview of the problem of “jurisdictional mismatch” in environmental policy, see Jonathan H. Adler, 
Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 NYU ENVTL. L.J. 130 (2005); see also Henry N. Butler & 
Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory 
Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23 (1996) (advocating a “match” between the scope of environmental 
problems and regulatory jurisdictions). 
9 LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 165.  Interestingly enough, at least one state, New Jersey, adopted a hazardous 
waste cleanup statute several years before Congress would enact CERCLA.  See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and 
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 596 (2001) (discussing the New 
Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act adopted in 1976). 
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enhance the role of the states”10 – a choice that undermined political accountability for hazardous 
waste policy.11   
Both programs have been plagued with excessive rigidity, poor prioritization, and 
minimal consideration of ecological (let alone economic) trade-offs.12  Under existing federal 
hazardous waste regulations, “society spends a disproportionate amount of resources addressing 
a relatively limited selection of the risks posed by toxic materials.”13  Existing federal hazardous 
waste regulations and cleanup requirements seem to be more a reaction to “popular fears” than a 
rational approach to “reducing actual risks.”14  While hazardous waste may have ranked high in 
public perceptions of environmental risks, subsequent EPA analyses concluded that the actual 
health risks posed by hazardous wastes have been “overrated.”15  
Under RCRA, the EPA regulates the generation, management, and disposal of hazardous 
wastes.  CERCLA, in contrast, governs the cleanup of sites subject to hazardous waste 
contamination.  Together, the two statutes impose extensive federal requirements on firms with 
nearly any connection to the creation, ownership, or disposal of wastes deemed hazardous by the 
                                                 
10 LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 239. 
11  Id. (“This allowed citizens to continue to treat hazardous waste as a problem someone else was going to solve for 
them.”). 
12 See Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
153, 154 (1988) (“the system has grown to the point where it amounts to nothing less than a massive effort at Soviet-
style planning of the economy to achieve environmental goals”); DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING 
SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 179-83 (1999) (summarizing problems of overly 
centralized environmental regulation). 
13 Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1521 
(1995). 
14 Id. at 1519 (“Important aspects of Superfund and RCRA seem geared more to responding to these popular fears 
than reducing actual risks.”). 
15 LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 297 (citing EPA assessments of relative risks posed by various environmental 
problems subject to EPA regulation); see also J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, REGULATIING POLLUTION: 
DOES THE U.S. SYSTEM WORK? __ (1997). 
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federal government.  These requirements are imposed with little regard for local risk preferences, 
environmental priorities, or ecological conditions.   
   
A. RCRA 
 
Enacted in 1976, RCRA was the first federal statute governing solid waste.16  RCRA’s 
Subtitle C creates a comprehensive “cradle-to-grave” regulatory regime for hazardous waste.17  
Subtitle C and the relevant implementing regulations govern the generation, transportation, 
storage, treatment and disposal of wastes classified as hazardous.  In 1984, Congress amended 
RCRA with the explicit purpose of constraining EPA discretion, forcing more stringent federal 
regulation, and discouraging land disposal of hazardous wastes.  The 1984 amendments also 
added a Corrective Action program governing the cleanup of RCRA sites that operates much like 
the Superfund program discussed below, as well as regulatory provisions specifically targeted at 
underground storage tanks, such as those used by service stations to store gasoline.  As a whole, 
RCRA imposes “a detailed , stringent, and frequently confusing” regulatory scheme.18  Noted 
                                                 
16 Hilary Sigman, Hazardous Waste and Toxic Substance Policies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 2nd ed.  218 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds. 2000).  RCRA Subtitle C governs hazardous 
waste. Other portions of RCRA govern other waste-related concerns.  Subtitle D, for example, concerns solid waste, 
but is less prescriptive than subtitle C. 
17 See U.S. EPA, RCRA ORIENTATION MANUAL 2006 (2006), at I-4 (“RCRA Subtitle C establishes a federal 
program to manage hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.”), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/general/orientat/rom1.pdf (last visited November 18, 2007).  Some would even say 
that RCRA regulates wastes “well beyond the grave.”  See Amer. Iron & Steel Inst. V. EPA, 886 F.2d 390, 393 
(D.C. Cir. 1989). 
18 Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA: The “Mind-Numbing” Provisions of the Most Complicated 
Environmental Statute, in RCRA DESKBOOK 3 (1991).  Of note, Hill wrote this description of RCRA while an 
attorney at the U.S. EPA. Id. 
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environmental attorney Michael Gerrard observes, RCRA is “one of the most relentlessly 
command-and-control statutes ever written.”19 
Structurally, RCRA adopts a fairly standard “cooperative federalism” model, under 
which the federal government encourages states to implement their own regulatory programs in 
accordance with federal standards.20  States that adopt their own hazardous regulations may seek 
authorization from the EPA to implement and enforce the federal program in the EPA’s stead.21  
In order to obtain such authorization, the relevant state program must meet or exceed the 
stringency of the respective federal rules and ensure adequate levels of enforcement.   These 
requirements are imposed quite rigidly, so states must meet or exceed EPA standards in every 
detail.22  States are not permitted to relax one regulatory provision in return for tightening 
another.  Such trade-offs are barred.    
Authorization of a state program makes the state eligible for federal funding, but such 
funding does not cover the costs of implementing even the core regulatory provisions of Subtitle 
C.23   Nor does the authorization process allow for much state flexibility.  At present, the vast 
                                                 
19 MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN TOXIC AND NUCLEAR WASTE 
SITING 206 (1994). 
20 See Babich, supra note __, at 1534 (“the essence of cooperative federalism is that states take primary 
responsibility for implementing federal standards, while retaining the freedom to apply their own, more stringent 
standards.”).  See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (“[W]here Congress has the authority 
to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the 
choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. 
. . . This arrangement . . . has been termed cooperative federalism.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 6926. 
22 See generally 40 C.F.R. § 271.14. 
23 See ASSOCIATION OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS, STATE RCRA SUBTITLE 
C CORE HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION COSTS—FINAL REPORT (January 2007). 
Although states are required to provide a 25 percent match for federal grants for RCRA implementation, “EPA 
currently provides only about 40% of the total funds necessary for States to run complete and adequate RCRA C 
programs.”  Id. at 3.  The funding shortfall is estimated at approximately $90 million.  Id. at 4. 
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majority of states have obtained authorization to implement some portion of RCRA’s rules.24  As 
of September 2007, however, only one state (Idaho) had authorization to implement 100 percent 
of the EPA’s RCRA rules.25 
While the federal-state relationship in hazardous waste regulation is supposed to be 
“cooperative,” many states have found it difficult to satisfy the EPA’s requirements for 
regulatory primacy. Implementation of RCRA’s requirements can be “incredibly confusing.”26 
An early assessment by EPA itself found a widespread perception among regulators and 
regulated alike that “standards for what constitutes adequate state capability [were] unclear and a 
moving target.”27 The EPA and state regulatory agencies have also fought over enforcement 
priorities.28    As a consequence, state innovation in hazardous waste management has been 
somewhat limited.29   
In 2005, approximately 15,000 firms qualified as large quantity generators of hazardous 
waste under RCRA.30  Yet a small percentage of hazardous waste generators are responsible for 
the majority of hazardous waste,31 and most hazardous waste is disposed at the point of 
                                                 
24 U.S. EPA, “RCRA State Authorization,” available at http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/state/index.htm 
(last visited November 18, 2007). 
25 See U.S. EPA, “Rule Authorization Percentage,” available at 
http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/state/stats/charts/statecom.pdf (last visited November 18, 2007).. 
26 Babich, supra note __, at 1539. 
27 U.S. EPA, THE RCRA IMPLEMENTATION STUDY: THE NATION’S HAZARDOUS ASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AT A 
CROSSROADS (1990). 
28 See, e.g., Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1998). 
29 Babich, supra note __, at 1540 (noting RCRA’s complexity “has generally prevented [states] from attempting 
significant innovations.”). 
30 U.S. EPA, THE NATIONAL BIENNIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT (BASED ON 2005 DATA) – NATIONAL ANALYSIS 
4-1 (2006). 
31 GERRARD, supra note __, at 8 (one percent of hazardous waste generators create 97 percent of hazardous wastes). 
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generation.32  In that year, these firms generated over 38 million tons of designated hazardous 
waste.33   While these figures may sound somewhat ominous, the volume of waste produced is 
not a particularly useful indicator of actual environmental risk.   
 Not all substances designated as “hazardous wastes” when disposed of are particularly 
hazardous.  Rather, “’hazardous waste’ and ‘hazardous substances’ are terms of art that say more 
about the legal status of chemicals than about the dangers those chemicals present.”34  Under 
RCRA, a “hazardous waste” is defined as: 
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, 
concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may (A) cause, 
or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious 
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or (B) pose a substantial present 
or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, 
stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.35 
While some wastes may be classified as hazardous because they demonstrate particular 
characteristics, most “hazardous” wastes receive this designation because they are listed as such 
                                                 
32 Id. at 8. 
33 Id. 
34 Babich, supra note __, at 1519. 
35 42 U.S.C. §6903 (5).  Under RCRA, “solid waste” is defined as: 
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution 
control facility and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous 
material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from community 
activities, but does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved 
materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are point sources subject to permits under 
section 1342 of title 33, or source, special nuclear, or byproduct material as defined by the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 923). 
42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). 
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by the EPA, a practice which has led to the listing of some “benign” wastes.36  Mixtures of 
nonhazardous and listed hazardous wastes are also classified as hazardous under RCRA, as are 
wastes, such as incinerator ash, that are “derived from” listed hazardous wastes, irrespective of 
whether the wastes in question exhibit hazardous properties.  Perhaps paradoxically, RCRA 
exempts small waste generators, and some wastes which would seem to present sufficient 
ecological risks to justify a “hazardous” designation are exempt.37  The rationale for such 
exemptions is “probably more political than environmental,” raising more questions about 
RCRA’s environmental benefits.38   
Once a waste is classified as “hazardous,” a basic menu of regulatory strictures falls in 
place.  The health and ecological risks posed by different types of wastes can “vary greatly.”39  
In straightforward terms, “hazardousness is not a dichotomous characteristic.”40  Nonetheless, 
RCRA’s regulatory requirements for different types of waste do not vary based upon the relevant 
risks and costs.41   
 One of RCRA’s goals is to encourage greater waste reduction and recycling, and it may 
have done so.  In some cases, however, RCRA regulations increase the costs associated with 
hazardous waste recovery and recycling.  For example, the implementation of RCRA regulations 
designed to prevent “sham” recycling and prevent soil or groundwater contamination resulting 
                                                 
36 Sigman, supra note __, at 219.   
37 Id. at 219; see also Babich, supra note __, at 1520 (“Congress and EPA have defined the term ‘hazardous waste’ 
to exclude many potentially dangerous materials.”). 
38 Sigman, supra note __, at 219. 
39 Id. at 218 (“Wastes vary greatly in the threats they pose.”); id. at 232 (“Any waste categorized as hazardous faces 
the same regulatory requirements, although wastes may vary greatly in the nature and extent of the dangers they 
pose.”). 
40 LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 94. 
41 Sigman, supra note __, at 232. 
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from insufficient safeguards also inflate the cost of legitimate hazardous waste recycling, in 
some cases increasing the volume of waste generated that is subject to RCRA’s regulatory 
requirements.42  Similarly, cost-effective waste reduction or disposal options can be inhibited by 
regulatory requirements. 43  RCRA’s land disposal restrictions have also “dramatically increased 
waste management costs for many facilities.”44   Such cost increases likely increased incentives 
for waste reduction and reuse, but may also have increased incentives for illegal dumping and 
disposal.  Insofar as burdensome and delay-ridden permit requirements obstruct the opening of 
new disposal sites, they may “harm the environment by perpetuating old, substandard 
facilities.”45  Further, some companies unsure of how RCRA regulations will be applied to their 
specific operations engage in precautionary “overcompliance,” which further increases the costs 
of such rules.”46 
 RCRA also imposes significant manifest and record-keeping requirements to facilitate the 
tracking of hazardous waste shipments and ensure proper management and disposal.  In practice, 
however, these requirements “do not seem to have helped enforce hazardous waste laws.”47  J 
Clarence Davies and Jan Mazurek concur: “Despite RCRA’s broad tracking and reporting 
provisions for hazardous waste, few data exist to show whether the law is achieving its goals.”48   
                                                 
42 See Jonathan H. Adler, The Hazards of Regulating Hazardous Waste, REG., vol. 16, no. 2, Spring 1993, available 
at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg16n2g.html. 
43 James Boyd, the Barriers to Corporate Pollution Prevention: An analysis of Three Cases, in IMPROVING 
REGULATION: CASES IN ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND SAFETY 100 (Paul S. Fischbeck & R. Scott Farrow eds. 2001). 
44 Sigman, supra note __, at 226. 
45 GERRARD, supra note __, at 82. 
46 Id. at 147. 
47 Sigman, supra note __, at 223. 
48 DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note __, at 20.   
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 While these regulations are well-intentioned, and designed to address real environmental 
concerns, their uniform and largely unwavering application across industries and regions reduces 
their environmental value.  All told, “we know little about [RCRA’s] effect on the environment,” 
concludes economist Hilary Sigman in an analysis conducted for Resources for the Future.49 
“RCRA may have reduced environmental contamination of air, groundwater, surface water, and 
soils.  However, there are no measures of these changes, let alone evaluations of how human 
health and the environment benefited from reduced contamination.”50  Improvements in 
hazardous waste management over the past three decades may have been due to RCRA.  At the 
same time, many of these improvements may have been driven by increased environmental 
awareness within corporations and among the general public, liability concerns, and local 
regulatory measures. In any event, RCRA is ripe for reform. 
 
B. CERCLA (“Superfund”) 
 
Congress enacted CERCLA in response to a perceived “crisis” of widespread, abandoned 
and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites during a lame-duck session following the Presidential 
election of 1980.51  The contamination of Love Canal, New York was particularly influential in 
                                                 
49 Sigman, supra note __, at 229. 
50 Sigman, supra note __, at 229.  But see Babich, supra note __, at 1522 (suggesting that RCRA and CERCLA 
“have dramatically improved environmental protection.”). 
51 CERCLA was enacted on December 11, 1980.  Of note, no committee report addressed the specific bill Congress 
enacted.  See John Quarles & Michael W. Steinberg, The Superfund Program at Its 25th Anniversary, 36 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10364, 10364 (2006).  See also Richard L. Stroup, Superfund: The Shortcut that Failed, in BREAKING THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GRIDLOCK 117 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1997) (“Superfund was enacted in an atmosphere 
of crisis.”). 
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driving passage of the Superfund statute.52  Yet the cause of waste contamination at Love Canal 
was not necessarily the result of irresponsible waste management practices by private industry,53 
nor is it clear the contamination created significant health risks for local residents.54   
CERCLA was intended to facilitate the rapid cleanup of contaminated sites and create a 
liability scheme to ensure that those firms potentially responsible for site contamination would 
be held financially responsible.  The principle was “shovels first, lawyers later.”55  The statute 
also created a trust fund, the “Superfund” of the statute’s name, to be used to finance site cleanup 
where potentially responsible parties had yet to be identified or contribute to cleanup costs.  
Although the cleanup and management of polluted properties would seem to be a local concern, 
CERCLA displaces state authority to a significantly greater extent than the major federal statutes 
governing air and water pollution.56  Largely due to its expansive liability provisions, which 
impose strict, joint and several liability on potentially responsible parties for waste site cleanup, 
Superfund is possibly the EPA’s “most controversial and most visible” program.57 
                                                 
52 See LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 133-42 (describing how Love Canal contamination drove perception of 
hazardous waste crisis and the eventual passage of Superfund).  
53 See Stroup, supra note __; Jerry Taylor, Salting the Earth: The Case for Repealing Superfund, REG., vol. 18, no. 2 
(1995);Eric Zeusse, Love Canal: The Truth Seeps Out, REASON, Feb. 1981. As Landy, et al., summarize, Love 
Canal’s public prominence was “the result of an admixture of faulty science, bureaucratic maneuvering, and 
electoral exigency.”  LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 140. 
54 Subsequent analyses of the health consequences of Love Canal’s contamination also cast doubt on initial claims. 
See Mark Reisch, Brownfield Issues in the 107th Congress, CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS, Apr. 24, 2007, at CRS-1, 
n.1; LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 133 (noting lack of epidemiological studies documenting increased health risks 
from Love Canal contamination). 
55 LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 142. 
56 James P. Young, Expanding State Initiation and Enforcement under Superfund, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 985, 999 
(1990).  See also Cannon, supra at 603 (noting “the interstate externalities argument for Superfund does not seem 
particularly strong compared to similar arguments for other federal environmental statutes”). 
57 See, e.g., Katherine N. Probst & Diane Sherman, Success for Superfund: A New Approach for Keeping Score 
(Resources for the Future, April 2004), at 1 (“The Superfund program is one of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) most controversial and most visible programs.”). 
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 Over 45,000 waste sites are listed in the EPA’s Superfund inventory.58  From among 
these sites, the EPA created a “National Priorities List” of sites eligible for federally funded 
cleanup.  As of 2007, the EPA has listed over 1,500 sites on the NPL.59  While the NPL 
theoretically represents those sites in most dire need of federal attention, there are reasons to 
suspect that the NPL may not consistently represent those sites of greatest environmental 
concern.60  At this point, it is reasonable to conclude that “the major risks from hazardous waste 
sites have probably been addressed through emergency removal actions.”61 
As originally implemented, the EPA defined “success” as completing cleanup of a site 
and deleting it from the NPL.  Yet many sites required monitoring and potential cleanup 
activities decades after their listing on the NPL, prompting the EPA in 1990 to redefine success 
as the completion of all physical construction necessary for site cleanup, “even if final cleanup 
levels or other requirements for the site have not been met.”62  By this measure, it is easier for 
the EPA to report “success” under CERCLA.   
In 2007, EPA reported that it had completed construction at 1030, or approximately two-
thirds, of all sites on the NPL.63  This number may not increase particularly rapidly in the years 
ahead, however, as many EPA offices appear to have focused their resources on sites requiring 
                                                 
58 Testimony of Susan Parker Bodine, Assistant Administrator, U.S. EPA, on “Superfund Oversight,” Senate 
Environment and Public Works Committee, Superfund, toxics, Risk and Waste Management Subcommittee, June 
16, 2006, 2006 WLNR 10423590 (noting EPA and “partners” have conducted assessments at 46,515 sites). 
59 U.S. EPA, “Superfund National Accomplishments Summary Fiscal Year 2007,” available at 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/accomp/numbers07.htm (last visited November 18, 2007). 
60 Sigman, supra note __, at 235. 
61 DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note __, at 21. 
62 Probst & Sherman, supra note __, at 1-2.  See also Jonathan Z. Cannon, Adaptive Management in Superfund: 
Thinking Like a Contaminated Site, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 561, 564 (2005) (“as it turned out, Superfund clean ups 
took much longer than intitially anticipated, and, even more significantly for our purposes, most Superfund sites 
have contaminants remaining after the remedy is completed and will require long-term monitoring and review.”). 
63 U.S. EPA, “Superfund National Accomplishments Summary Fiscal Year 2007,” available at 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/accomp/numbers07.htm (last visited November 18, 2007). 
 
DRAFT – Not for Citation  Adler, Haz. Waste – Page 14 
 
 
shorter or less complicated cleanup operations, leaving sites requiring “more complex, lengthy, 
and expensive cleanups” to be addressed in the future.64  Further, the construction complete 
measure is, at best, an “indicator of interim progress” and provides little “information on what 
the program has accomplished in terms of protecting human health and the environment, 
reducing risk to those living and working near sites, or reducing contamination and risks to the 
environment.”65  Empirical research finds little evidence that EPA prioritizes waste site cleanups 
based upon the actual environmental risks sites present to local communities and surrounding 
ecosystems.66 
Superfund is “notorious for fostering too much litigation and too little actual cleanup.”67  
Under the statute, any firm that generated, transported, or managed hazardous materials 
discovered at a waste site may be held liable for cleanup costs.  The average cost for cleaning up 
a single waste site is approximately $20 million, according to the Congressional Research 
Service, which leads potentially liable firms to pursue litigation or other means of spreading the 
cleanup costs among other potentially responsible parties.68  At some sites, the number of 
potentially responsible parties may reach into the hundreds of firms.69 
                                                 
64 Probst & Sherman, supra note __, at 2-3; Cannon, supra note __, at 594. 
65 Probst & Sherman, supra note __, at 3. 
66 Hilary Sigman, The Pace of Progress at Superfund Sites: Policy Goals and Interest Group Influence, NBER 
WORKING PAPER NO. 7704 (May 2000). 
67 Babich, supra note __, at 1520. 
68 Reisch, supra note __, at CRS-7.  As Rhoads and Shogren observe, “Superfund pits one firm against another.  
This creates an environmental conflict in which several players invest effort to win a fixed reward—the avoided 
cleanup costs.”  Thomas A. Rhoads & Jason F. Shogren, Current Issues in Superfund Amendment and 
Reauthorization: How Is the Clinton Adminsitraiton Handling Hazardous Waste? 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
FORUM 245, 254 (1998). 
69 Reisch, supra note __, at CRS-7. 
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Under Superfund regulations, the EPA may require cleanup measures even where 
opposed by local residents or otherwise unjustified by demonstrable risks to public health.70  
Federal oversight and control of waste site cleanup has meant that federal law drives land-use 
decisions concerning once contaminated lands, leading to conflict with local communities and 
state and local governments.71  Although the EPA is required to consult with state officials when 
making cleanup decisions, it need not obtain state approval for site remedies.  The EPA’s efforts 
to develop standardized protocols has also led to largely haphazard remedy selection.72  The cost 
per cancer case averted varies greatly from site to site, but can be quite high when compared to 
the cost-effectiveness of other environmental programs.  While some sites may present 
significant health risks that can be ameliorated at a reasonable cost, an analysis by James 
Hamilton and Kip Viscusi found that the cost per cancer case averted was over $100 million at 
seventy percent of current Superfund sites.73  
Superfund was initially funded by the imposition of a corporate income tax and excise 
taxes on petroleum and chemical feedstocks.  The Superfund taxes generated approximately $1.5 
billion per year until the taxes expired at the end of 1995.74  Since that time, the Superfund has 
been funded by the U.S. Treasury out of general tax revenues.  The justification for the 
                                                 
70 See, e.g, Richard L. Stroup, Superfund: The Shortcut that Failed, in BREAKING THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
GRIDLOCK 128 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1997) (discussing controversial cleanup lead tailings at mine sites in Idaho 
and Colorado). 
71 See, e.g., Young, supra note __, at 990 (“CERCLA’s displacement of the states in the cleanup process creates 
potential sources of friction between the federal and state governments.”). 
72 See Sigman, supra note __, at 238-39. 
73 See James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, How Costly Is Clean? An Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of 
Superfund Site Remediations, 18 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 2 (1999).  See also John Quarles & Michael W. 
Steinberg, The Superfund Program at Its 25th Anniversary, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10364, 10367 (2006) (“To the extent 
that Superfund is viewed as a national program for the protection of public health, there are many other federal 
environmental programs that provide far greater health benefits for the costs associated with them.”). 
74 Mark Reisch, Brownfield Issues in the 107th Congress, CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS, Apr. 24, 2007., at CRS-2. 
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Superfund taxes was that corporations generally, and oil and chemical companies in particular, 
were most responsible for waste site contamination, so such “polluters” should be those that pay 
for the cleanup.75  Yet there is little, if any, relationship between chemical use by firms and their 
relative responsibility for environmental contamination.  If anything, larger firms are more likely 
to have complied with existing regulations and industry best practices, and yet they may have 
paid a comparatively larger share of Superfund taxes. 
 A recent concern about Superfund was its potential to discourage the cleanup and 
redevelopment of industrial sites.  If the clean up costs for abandoned urban industrial sites to 
prepare them for redevelopment were not enough in themselves, the potential for Superfund 
liability discouraged investors further.76  The effect of Superfund on such “Brownfields” 
prompted the passage of modest Superfund reforms in 2002.  At the time these reforms were 
adopted, the EPA estimated there were over 500,000 brownfield sites in the United States that 
were “underutilized or ignored, posing health risks and impeding the revitalization of inner city 
neighborhoods, which were once important centers of industrial activity.”77  The 2002 reforms 
relaxed liability for some innocent landowners so as to reduce the disincentive to cleanup and 
reuse potentially contaminated sites.  One purpose of the Brownfields reform was to remove a 
substantial barrier to private company participation in state voluntary cleanup programs.  
Another problem with Superfund has been its potential to inhibit technological innovation in 
waste remediation.78 
                                                 
75 But see LANDY ET AL., supra note __, at 148 (summarizing argument that Superfund taxes did not embody 
“polluter pays” principle as intended). 
76 Hope Whitney, Cities and Superfund: Encouraging Brownfield Redevelopment, 30 ECOLOGY L. Q. 59, 67 (2003). 
77 Id. at 64. 
78 See Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation: Are Justice, Efficiency, and 
Democracy Reconcilable? 92 NW. U. L. REV. 706, 718 (1998). 
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 Superfund has not been a total waste.  The one aspect of CERCLA universally 
recognized as a success is the emergency cleanup and removal provisions.  Some even term these 
provisions “one of the great environmental achievements” of federal environmental policy.79  
Over the past 27 years, the EPA has conducted approximately 9,000 removal actions at over 
6,000 waste sites.80  Removal actions address potential environmental contamination and health 
threats not necessarily addressed by the remedial program.81  Contrary to some assumptions, 
removal actions continue to require significant outlays.  The requirements of quick and efficient 
waste removal appear to justify continued federal involvement in this regard.  Even those 
removal actions that are not “emergency” actions are typically “time-critical” actions.82 
 
 
II. DEVOLVING HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY 
 
 A consequence of both RCRA and CERCLA is the excessive centralization of hazardous 
waste policy to the detriment of sound environmental policy.  As an environmental concern, 
hazardous waste rarely presents the sort of risks that typically justify federal regulation.  As 
noted above, the waste itself is not pollution but a “precursor to pollution.”  It only causes 
pollution if improperly handled or disposed of, where its primary environmental effect is its 
                                                 
79 See J. William Futrell, Superfund and Reactionary Rhetoric, ENVTL. F., Jan./Feb. 1994, at 56. 
80 Bodine, supra note __. 
81 KATHERINE N. PROBST & DAVID M. KONISKY, SUPERFUND’S FUTURE: WHAT WILL IT COST? 16 (2001). 
82 Id. at 22, Figure 2-1 (illustrating that most removal actions FY1992-1999 were either emergency responses or 
time-critical removal acitons). 
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potential to contaminate water resources, groundwater in particular.83  The cleanup of individual 
hazardous waste sites is also a localized environmental concern.  Individual sites “are not 
interconnected: they are discrete and usually within the confines of a single state.”84  Their 
ecological and economic effects are centered around the sites themselves.  Even where such 
concerns extend across jurisdictional boundaries, they most often remain quite local problems. 
 Centralization of hazardous waste policy is particularly difficult to justify if regulatory 
structures are to match the scale of targeted environmental concerns.  As a general matter, 
environmental regulatory measures will tend to be more efficient and effective where there is a 
match between the scope of the problem and that of the responsible jurisdiction.85  Air pollution 
may permeate a local airshed, spread across broad regions, or even disperse throughout the 
global atmosphere.  Pollution of rivers and streams can likewise travel great distances, harming 
communities throughout a watershed.  By comparison, most of the environmental problems most 
associated with hazardous waste – such as soil and groundwater contamination – are typically 
quite confined.  As a consequence, both the costs and benefits of existing environmental 
contamination and remedial measures are felt locally.  For this reason, it is “logical” to address 
waste issues at the state or local level “because of the disparity in the types of waste produced in 
different areas of the nation, differing population concentrations, and varying ability of land for 
landfilling and other disposal or treatment practices.”86   
                                                 
83 Sigman, supra note __, at 217.  Sigman notes that “Although groundwater protection is the primary motivation for 
hazardous waste regulation, hazardous waste management may have other environmental costs.” Id. at 218. 
84 Young, supra note __, at 998. 
85 See Adler, Mismatch, supra note __; Butler & Macey, supra note __; Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental 
Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 587 (1996) (where the scope of a problem does not match the responsible 
institution’s jurisdiction, “the cost-benefit calculus will be skewed and either too little or too much environmental 
protection will be provided.”). 
86 Weiland & O’Leary, supra note __, at 211. 
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 The primary environmental concern in hazardous waste management is the potential for 
improper waste management and disposal to contaminate local drinking water supplies.87  Yet it 
is difficult to identify an environmental concern (other than land-use) where the argument for 
federal intervention is weaker – and the argument for local or state control stronger – than 
drinking water.  As a general matter, drinking water quality in one community has no effect upon 
drinking water in neighboring jurisdictions, let alone states half a nation away.88  Even where 
underground water pollution crosses state lines, this does not justify the adoption of federal 
standards for hazardous waste storage, management and disposal.  Targeted interstate remedies 
would be preferable.89  If state and local governments lack the capacity to monitor hazardous 
waste management practices and site cleanup, this could justify financial and technical support 
from the federal government, but not the sort of extensive regulatory programs that now exist. 
 The improper handling, treatment or disposal of hazardous waste will pose different 
levels of environmental risk in different places.  Just as some wastes will be more prone to 
seeping into groundwater supplies, or more difficult to remediate, some areas will be more 
vulnerable to such contamination.  A region in which liquid wastes migrate rapidly through 
underground water supplies may need more restrictive measures than a region in which the soil 
                                                 
87 This is not to minimize the potential occupational health risks that can result from the improper management and 
handling of hazardous materials.  Rather, such risks are more properly thought of occupational health risks – the sort 
regulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration – rather than by the EPA. 
88 See Paul R. Portney, Environmental Policy in the Next Century, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 2000 
ELECTION AND BEYOND 379 (1999); Terry M. Dinan, Maureen L. Cropper, and Paul R. Portney, Environmental 
Federalism: Welfare Losses from Uniform National Drinking Water Standards, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC 
ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WALLACE E. OATES 14 (Arvind Panagariya, Paul R. Portney, & Robert M. 
Schwab eds. 1999). 
89 See infra. 
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is largely impermeable, or where hazardous waste can be effectively isolated.90  Other variations 
in the environmental costs of hazardous waste management and disposal could include 
population density or other factors.91  When evaluating various sites for waste management and 
disposal, it is important to keep in mind that there is no such thing as a “perfect” waste disposal 
site, as all siting decisions involve trade-offs.92  At the same time, local environmental 
preferences for environmental risk reduction may vary across states, justifying different types of 
regulatory measures.  The nature of the actual environmental threat, and the relative priority 
placed upon regulation or remediation, will vary form place to place. 
 States already adopt slightly different hazardous waste policies from one another, 
reflecting differing ecological conditions and political priorities.  For example, many states have 
imposed hazardous waste taxes, either feedstock or “waste-end” taxes.  Such taxes vary 
significantly, which could be due to differences in local environmental preferences or different 
environmental costs from hazardous waste generation.93  Such taxes reduce the volume of 
hazardous waste generated within the relevant states, even if only by a marginal amount.94  It is 
no surprise that state hazardous waste taxes are higher in states with greater membership in 
conservation organizations.95  More interesting, “disposal tax rates are higher in states with high 
groundwater use, suggesting groundwater protection as a motivation for the taxes.”96 
                                                 
90 Sigman, Taxing, supra note __, at 16 (“Land disposal may cause less damage to the environment in more arid 
areas because there is less risk that contaminants seep into groundwater.  It could be more costly in places with 
greater reliance on groundwater for drinking water, agriculture, and other uses.”).  
91 Id. at 18. 
92 GERRARD, supra note __, at 53 (idea of “perfect” disposal site is a “mirage”). 
93 Sigman, Taxing, supra note __, at 15-16. 
94 Id. at 22. 
95 Id. at 21. 
96 Id. 
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If, as some economists believe, the use of such taxes is a more efficient way to address the 
potential risks of hazardous wastes than proscriptive regulations,97 it is noteworthy that states 
have been more aggressive in this regard than the federal government,98 and that those states that 
rely the most on groundwater have been the most aggressive.   
 The argument for local control of waste site cleanup is even greater than for hazardous 
waste management.  Theoretically, poor waste management practices in one location could lead 
to contamination elsewhere (though the contamination is likely to remain regional).  Once a 
specific site is contaminated, however, it becomes a local land-use and risk management 
concern.  The cleanup, and potential redevelopment of an individual site is the quintessential 
local environmental concern traditionally left in the hands of state or local governments.  Equally 
important, decisions about the present and future use of individual sites necessarily requires the 
consideration of inherently local knowledge about ecological conditions, economic needs, and 
subjective local desires.   
As a practical matter, “the Superfund program itself cannot address the full universe of 
contaminated sites.  The massive number of such sites—hundreds of thousands—exceeds any 
plausible reach of direct federal involvement.”99  Each site is different, requiring site-by-site 
management and remedy selection.100  “Physical attributes of the sites, such as annual rainfall 
and proximity to surface water and groundwater” will “vary greatly” from site to site.101  As a 
                                                 
97 Id. at 24. 
98 For one account of why there has not been a greater reliance upon such taxes at the federal level, see Marc Landy 
& Mary Hague, The Coalition for Waste: Private Interests and Superfund, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC 
COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992). 
99 John Quarles & Michael W. Steinberg, The Superfund Program at Its 25th Anniversary, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10364, 
10367 (2006). 
100 Sigman, supra note __, at 237. 
101 Id. 
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consequence, “selecting a sound remedial action at a site requires a good dose of common sense 
and ‘engineering judgment’ since no two sites are the same.”102   
Waste site cleanup and containment decisions require substantial information, much of 
which is only available at the local level.  As former EPA general counsel Jonathan Cannon 
notes, such decisions require information about: 
 (1) the nature, quantity and location of contaminants on site; (2) site 
characteristics, including ecosystem processes such as ground water flow and 
microbial activity; (3) costs and effectiveness of remedies; (4) political and 
economic conditions affecting cleanup and reuse; (5) values affecting the merits 
of alternative site uses.103 
With the possible exception of (3), this is all local information, more readily accessible to state 
and local officials than federal regulators in Washington, D.C., or even environmental officials in 
regional EPA offices.  Even the cost and effectiveness of specific remedies will depend, in part, 
upon local conditions, the knowledge and understanding of which state and local officials are 
more likely to have than their federal counterparts. Lack of knowledge of present conditions and 
potential and likely future land uses, for example, can lead to unrealistic risk assessment 
calculations and the adoption of cleanup measures substantially more (or less) stringent than 
necessary.104 
 The fifth item in Cannon’s list is particularly important.  There is no objective, scientific 
way to determine how “clean” a contaminated waste site must be before it is considered “safe,” 
                                                 
102 Testimony of J. Winston Porter, Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on 
Superfund and Waste Management, June 15, 2006, available at http://www.winporter.com/testimony4.html. 
103 Cannon, supra note __, at 571-72. 
104 See, e.g., Rhoads & Shogren, supra note __, at 260-61 (describing how failure to account for local land uses at 
Idaho Pole Superfund site in Bozeman, Montana led to excessive remediation measures). 
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nor is there a single correct answer to how such sites should be managed.  Risk preferences, like 
aesthetic preferences, are subjective, and will vary from place to place.  “The state and local 
community typically have strong concerns about the environmental risks at a given site, but they 
also may have concerns about other issues,” ranging from site maintenance costs, the impact of 
various cleanup plans on future site uses and local economic development, and local quality of 
life issues.105  “The local community also stands to reap a substantial portion of the non-
environmental benefits of clean up, including the benefits that flow from reuse of the site, and 
may also be in the best position to assess those benefits.”106  
An empirical study of the effect of waste site cleanups on real estate values suggests 
“individuals place a small value” on a waste site’s inclusion in the federal Superfund program.107  
As reported by the study’s authors, “these findings suggest that the mean local benefits of a 
Superfund clean-up as measured through the housing market” are lower than the cost of the 
average Superfund site cleanup.”108  This is not likely to be the result of insufficient concern for 
hazardous waste contamination in local communities.  To the contrary, as economist William 
Fischel has documented, local homeowners are a particularly powerful political force, and are 
more likely to be overly protective of local home values.109  Homeowners tend to be very risk 
averse about local changes or developments that have the potential to depress land values, and 
                                                 
105 Cannon, supra note __, at 582. 
106 Id. at 582. 
107 Michael Greenstone & Justin Gallagher, Does Hazardous Waste Matter? Evidence from the Housing Market and 
the Superfund Program, M.I.T. Dept. of Economics Working Paper 05-27, Sept. 2006, at 2. 
108 Id. 
109 See generally, WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001). 
 
DRAFT – Not for Citation  Adler, Haz. Waste – Page 24 
 
 
this risk aversion “pervades all local political decisions.”110  Even those homeowners who are not 
particularly concerned about the environmental effects of proposed developments or industrial 
activities are likely to recognize that prospective buyers might.111  As a consequence, if 
Superfund cleanups do not increase local property values, it is unlikely that they are providing 
meaningful environmental protection.  One can go even farther, concluding that “across a wide 
range of housing market outcomes, there is little evidence that Superfund clean-ups increase 
social welfare substantially.  In light of the significant resources devoted to these clean-ups and 
the claims of large health benefits, this finding is surprising.”112  
Some are concerned that allowing more local control over waste management and 
disposal policies will result in more such activities in poorer communities.  Such concerns may 
be warranted, but it is hardly clear that centralizing and politicizing such decisions is an 
improvement.  Communities without significant economic resources are unlikely to be 
particularly influential within government agencies.113  Byzantine regulatory processes rarely 
facilitate public participation by politically marginalized communities.  Moreover, some 
communities see waste management and disposal facilities as potential “vehicles for economic 
development.”114 
 While it may be tempting to argue that states lack the “scientific, technical or legal 
sophistication” necessary to ensure the cleanup and remediation of complex contaminated sites, 
this concern is at least “partially offset by the geographic heterogeneity of contaminated sites, 
                                                 
110 Id. at 163. 
111 Id. at 163-64 
112 Greenstone and Gallagher, supra note __, at 33. 
113 GERRARD, supra note __, at 88. 
114 Id. at 135. 
 
DRAFT – Not for Citation  Adler, Haz. Waste – Page 25 
 
 
where on-the-ground knowledge is of central importance, and the diversity of circumstances is 
salient.”115  Further, the federal government could provide much of the necessary technical 
know-how without imposing regulatory standards governing site cleanup.  It is one thing to 
inform a community about contemporary best management practices and the likely consequences 
of various cleanup and containment measures.  It is quite another to dictate which measures must 
be adopted and at what cost. 
It is often assumed that there was little ability or effort to control hazardous wastes prior 
to the adoption of federal regulations.  History suggests otherwise.116  As early as 1924, every 
state had statutes governing industrial wastes of some kind, albeit statutes far less protective than 
those in place today.117  Intrastate pollution caused by the improper handling or disposal of 
hazardous wastes was commonly recognized as a nuisance prior to World War II,118 even if 
pollution was rarely prosecuted as a public nuisance,119 and in many states laws specifically 
designated pollution from particular industrial wastes as nuisances.120  In some states, local laws 
prohibited certain types of industrial activities in densely populated areas.121  While few 
corporations were concerned with projecting a “green” image during this period, many firms 
recognized the potential liability that could result from poor waste management practices.122  By 
                                                 
115 Cannon, supra note __, at 604 (quotation omitted). 
116 CRAIG E. COLTEN & PETER N. SKINNER, THE ROAD TO LOVE CANAL: MANAGING INDUSTRIAL WASTE BEFORE 
EPA 69 (1996) (observing “the historical literature indicates that numerous legal mechanisms existed to address 
actions seen as hazardous before 1970.”). 
117 Id. at 75 
118 Id. at 125. 
119 Id. (“At the time, however, there was virtually no state or public prosecution of nuisance-causing activities.”). 
120 Id. at 72. 
121 Id. at 125. 
122 Id at 102. 
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1970, local efforts were more comprehensive, and waste management practices were informed 
(albeit not consistently controlled) by various national trade associations with substantial 
expertise.123  Much of the hazardous waste pollution that attracted public attention in the 1960s 
and 1970s was the result of “casual waste management practices” that often contradicted the best 
practices recommended by industry and standard-setting associations, 124 rather than a lack of 
knowledge about potential environmental risks.125  Given the potential liability exposure from 
such acts, industrial bad actors may have been no more responsible under a modern regulatory 
regime. 
There is room to debate when and whether states would have adopted more 
comprehensive hazardous waste regulations absent RCRA’s impetus.  With RCRA in place, 
however, most states use federal regulations as a “floor” for their own regulatory programs.126  
There is some evidence that states seek RCRA authorization in order to adopt more stringent 
regulatory requirements than those imposed by the federal government.127  Sigman found that  
“Several states have expanded their definitions [of hazardous waste] beyond the federal 
requirements.”128  According to another study, “Over the past 25 years, most states have 
                                                 
123 Id. at 2. 
124 Id. at 2. 
125 Id. at 163 (noting “there was sufficient knowledge that chemical waste could cause environmental damage to 
foster cautious practices” well before the enactment of federal environmental laws). 
126 Ann O’M. Bowman, Hazardous Waste Management: An Emerging Policy Area within an Emerging Federalism, 
15 PUBLIUS 131, 138 (1985). 
127 Hilary Sigman, Letting States Do the  Dirty Work: State Responsibility for Federal Environmental Regulation, 
Working Paper, Nov. 21, 2002., at 16. 
128 Sigman, supra note __, at 220. 
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improved their institutional capacity substantially, and many have adopted innovative programs 
that go well beyond the efforts of the federal government.”129 
While some environmental analysts express concern that allowing grater state flexibility 
could lead to a destructive “race-to-the-bottom,” under which states adopt progressively lax, and 
suboptimal, environmental protections, the empirical evidence to date does not support such 
concerns.130  In fact, the available empirical evidence suggests that, if anything, any “race” 
among jurisdictions is “to the top,” as states seem more likely to increase their environmental 
efforts in response to neighboring jurisdictions’ actions than to relax regulation.131  A study of 
state groundwater protection found an upward pattern in state efforts to protect groundwater.132  
Such data suggests a “race to the top” in the protection of such local resources, rather than a 
“race to the bottom.” 
 States have become particularly aggressive in developing their own waste site cleanup 
programs, some of which appear to outperform the federal Superfund program.  New Jersey’s 
waste cleanup law, the Spill Compensation and Control Act, was adopted in 1976, 
contemporaneously with RCRA and several years before CERCLA.133  At the time, New Jersey 
was one of the few states to take the problem of waste site cleanup seriously.  Today, however, 
states are in the lead.  States are responsible for the vast majority of hazardous waste cleanups 
                                                 
129 Michael E. Kraft & Denise Scheberle, Environmental Federalism at Decade’s End: New Approaches and 
Strategies, 28 PUBLIUS 131, 133 (1998). 
130 See Adler, Mismatch, supra note __, at ___ (summarizing empirical research failing to find evidence of a “race-
to-the-bottom” among competing jurisdictions in environmental policy). 
131 See Wallace E. Oates, A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in RECENT ADVANCES IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 15 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002) (“States appear to be ‘pulled’ to higher 
levels of abatement spending by more stringent measures in neighboring states, but relatively lax regulations nearby 
appear to have no effect on such expenditures”).   
132 PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 191-92 (2004). 
133 Revesz, supra note __, at 596. 
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across the United States,” observed New Hampshire Environmental Services Commissioner 
Robert W. Varney in 2000.134  Many states are “fully capable of managing all hazardous waste 
cleanup programs within their borders, and some already come quite close.135  The number of 
state government employees working for state cleanup programs exceeds the number of federal 
employees who work on Superfund-related matters.136  By 2001, every state had rules governing 
liability for waste site cleanup, and most states had established funds to help pay for cleanup at 
abandoned sites.137 
Most states have sought to clean up contaminated properties within their borders, even 
without delegation of authority from EPA.138  Almost every state has a hazardous waste cleanup 
statute of its own.139  In FY 2000, for instance, states completed cleanups at 4,500 non-NPL 
sites, almost half of which under state-level voluntary cleanup programs.140  According to the 
Environmental Law Institute, by the end of FY 2000, states had cumulatively cleaned up 
approximately 29,000 hazardous waste sites since 1976.141  By 2001, 41 states had long-term 
stewardship programs to ensure that restore sites did not pose renewed threats to public health.142  
All but three states – Vermont, North Dakota, and South Dakota –had formal voluntary cleanup 
                                                 
134 Statement of Robert W. Varney, Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services, before 
the Committee on Environment & Public Works, Subcommittee on Superfund, Waste Control and Risk Assessment, 
Mar. 21, 2000, at 2.  Varney’s statement was delivered on behalf of the Environmental Council of the States, 
135 Id. at 3. 
136 Revesz, supra note __, at 597. 
137 Id. at 596-97. 
138 See Babich, supra note __, at 1549 (“Even in the face of EPA’s refusal to delegate under Superfund, most states 
have accepted the challenge of attempting to clean up contaminated property.”). 
139 See Young, supra note __, at 994. 
140 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY, 2001 
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programs in place by the end of 2001, but two of those states still allowed privately initiated 
voluntary cleanups.143  Most states have adopted standards and procedures for the use of 
institutional controls to limit the future uses of cleanup sites.144  Some have adopted the Uniform 
Environmental Covenants Act (UECA), while others have adopted standards of their own.145   
Different states have adopted different approaches,146 including different standards for 
cleanup liability, and many programs have been quite successful.147  Overall, “the diversity of 
approaches taken by the states to the problem of hazardous waste cleanup in their own statutes 
reflects different policy trade-offs with respect to those cleanups.”148  As former EPA official J. 
Winston Porter noted in 1994: 
the 40 states that have hazardous-waste cleanup programs do their work fairly 
quickly. In Minnesota, for example, cleanups routinely take two to three years and 
cost less than $5 million. New York has restored more than 140 sites, and 
Wisconsin has completed work on more than 200—more than all of Superfund.149 
The state of New Hampshire is responsible for investigating and overseeing cleanup of 97 
percent of the hazardous waste sites in the state.150   
                                                 
143 Id. 
144 See ASSOCIATION OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS, STATE STATUS IN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS: SUMMARY OF INVENTORY FINDINGS (June 2007), at 1. 
145 Id. at 9. 
146 See Young, supra note __, at 994. 
147 See id. at 997; J. Winston Porter, Cleaning Up Superfund: The Case for State Environmental Leadership 5 
(Reason Pub. Policy Inst., Policy Study No. 195, 1995) (noting many state cleanup programs outperform the federal 
Superfund program). 
148 Young, supra note __, at 999. 
149 J. Winston Porter, Let States Clean Up Superfund’s Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1994. 
150 Varney, supra note __, at 2. 
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As state authorities have gained greater experience with waste site management and 
cleanup, they have increased their effectiveness.  The number of sites cleaned up in 2000 was 
equivalent to the number cleaned up in 1997, but in 2000 states were able to achieve this cleanup 
at 10 percent lower cost.151  There is some dispute whether state sites are, on average, less 
contaminated and inherently less costly to remediate than federal sites.152  Without question, 
some so-called “mega sites” in the federal program are the largest, most complex, and most 
difficult sites to remediate in the nation.  Such sites may demand continued federal involvement.  
Yet there is no reasons states cannot assume greater authority for the majority of sites now 
handled under the federal Superfund program. 
 Transferring primary regulatory authority over hazardous waste to state and local 
governments could lead to substantial environmental improvements.  A lessening of federal 
regulatory requirements could induce states to further enhance their own programs.153  
Furthermore, insofar as hazardous waste policy involves trade-offs among competing subjective 
values, decentralized control would lead to greater accountability and consideration of competing 
environmental policy goals.  As Landy, et al., explain: 
Decentralization offers several advantages for preserving responsibility and 
fostering civic education.  The national government is remote, both spatially and 
psychologically. Political processes in Washington are complex, cumbersome, 
and difficult to influence compared with smaller units of government. . . . 
Limiting federal involvement also discourages the naïve notion that those who are 
                                                 
151 ELI 50-STATE STUDY, supra note __. 
152 PROBST & KONISKY, supra note __, at 93. 
153 For a discussion of how federal environmental regulations can discourage or “crowd out” state programs, see 
Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67 (2007). 
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not at fault have no responsibility for solving a problem.  It helps citizens to 
recognize that, to an important degree, hazardous waste belongs to that category 




III. THE PROPER FEDERAL ROLE 
 
 State primacy in hazardous waste policy does not mean that the federal government has 
no role to play. To the contrary, while the federal role should recede in some respects, there are 
strong arguments for greater federal action in others.  The present need is not so much for less 
federal involvement as it is better federal involvement achieved by concentrating on those areas 
in which the federal government has a comparative advantage.155  Specifically, the federal 
government should focus its efforts on those areas in which, either due to economies of scale or a 
particular federal interest, federal involvement can avoid needless duplication, inefficiency, or 
interstate conflict.  This means that the federal government should provide greater levels of 
technical and scientific support, maintain its emergency removal capacity, develop more 
effective means of addressing interstate spillovers, and maintain regulatory primacy over 
interstate transportation of and commerce in hazardous wastes. 
 
A. Scientific Research and Technical Guidance 
                                                 
154 LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 166. 
155 See Adler, Mismatch, supra note __. 
 




There is little question that there are economies of scale in some types of scientific 
research that can inform the development of hazardous waste management programs and waste 
site cleanups.  While much of the information required for effective environmental protection is 
local in nature, as discussed above, much of the relevant scientific knowledge will apply 
nationwide.156  The health or environmental risks posed by given substances in given quantities 
or concentrations, and the rate at which contamination disperses in given media, are the sorts of 
complex technical matters that can best be investigated at the federal level.  Asking each state to 
conduct its own risk assessments would be exceedingly wasteful, particularly when one 
considers the thousands of materials that can be regulated as hazardous wastes.157 The General 
Accounting Office, in recommending greater state involvement in waste site cleanups, noted the 
need for increased technical support from the federal government for states to perform such 
functions effectively.158  With more technical and scientific information at the ready, state 
officials will be more able to manage the environmental risks hazardous wastes may pose. 
Similarly, the federal government can play a valuable role in identifying and describing 
“best practices” in hazardous waste management and documenting various waste site cleanup 
methods.  As the GAO reported, states would benefit from the EPA’s assistance “in developing 
                                                 
156 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CONFRONTING THE NATION’S WATER PROBLEMS: THE ROLE OF RESEARCH 68 
(2004) (a federal role “is appropriate in those research areas where the benefits of such research are widely dispersed 
and do not accrue only to those who fund the research”). 
157 See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 614-15 (1996) (“Absent 
centralized functions, independent state regulators will either duplicate each other’s analytic work of engage in time-
consuming and complex negotiations to establish an efficient division of technical labor.”).  Of course it is possible 
that “competition” could improve scientific research insofar as different entities pursue different research 
methodologies to address emerging environmental problems.   
158 U.S. GAO, SUPERFUND: STRONGER EPA-STATE RELATIONSHIP CAN IMPROVE CLEANUPS AND REDUCE COSTS, 
GAO/RCED-97-77 (April 1997). 
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innovative cleanup technologies and in evaluating their effectiveness.”159  There is even value in 
having the federal government act as a central repository for information about various 
regulatory and non-regulatory strategies for dealing with hazardous waste policy questions.160  In 
this fashion, the federal government can help inform state-level policy decisions, by clarifying 
the relevant costs and benefits of given actions, without displacing local expertise or values.  
This could produce more informed waste policy decisions that remain consistent with local 
needs, values, and concerns. 
 
B. Regulation of Interstate Commerce 
 
 There is substantial interstate commerce in hazardous waste management services.  In 
2005, over four million tons of hazardous waste was shipped across state lines.161  Insofar as 
transportation and shipment of hazardous waste presents risks to environmental and public 
health, this interstate waste trade should continue to be regulated at the federal level so as to 
ensure a uniform set of rules for all waste-related interstate commerce.  A single set of 
transportation regulations, perhaps quite similar to those already in place under RCRA requiring 
recordkeeping and proper storage and containment during transport, will be more efficient than 
variable state and local rules.  Further, the environmental and public health risks posed by the 
transportation of hazardous wastes are distributed across those jurisdictions through which such 
wastes travel, and are not localized the way the individual facilities or waste sites are.  Even if 
                                                 
159 Id.. 
160 Id.  (noting value of EPA assistance in “generating standards and technical guidance, and sharing information 
across states and regions). 
161 U.S. EPA, THE NATIONAL BIENNIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT (BASED ON 2005 DATA) – NATIONAL 
ANALYSIS 1-1 (2006). 
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existing transportation and reporting regulations need to be reformed, they should remain the 
province of the federal government. 
Not only should the federal government retain responsibility for regulating this interstate 
commerce, it should preempt state regulation of hazardous waste transportation, insofar as such 
regulations threaten to disrupt interstate markets in waste management services.  The dormant 
commerce clause already bars states from adopting measures that limit the importation of waste 
from other states,162 as does the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act.163  Yet 
it is also important that states are prevented from adopting purportedly nondiscriminatory 
measures that would unnecessarily impede interstate commerce.  Were each state allowed to 
adopt its own regulations governing the transportation of hazardous wastes, haulers could face of 
disruptive patchwork of variable, and potentially conflicting, requirements.  If allowed to adopt 
protectionist measures that impose a substantial share of their costs on outsiders, states are likely 
to do so.  The proliferation of variable standards could balkanize interstate markets, eliminating 
the efficiencies that result from a vibrant interstate market in waste management services.  Waste 
management facilities that serve larger markets may take advantage of economies of scale to 
handle waste more efficiently and with less environmental risk.  A lack of federal preemption 
could also allow an individual state with particularly stringent transport regulations to set the de 
facto national standard, effectively imposing the environmental preferences of its residents on 
the nation as a whole.  If a given state is particularly vulnerable to the risks of improper waste 
management, or its citizens simply desire greater levels of protection, a state would remain free 
                                                 
162 See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, __ U.S. __ (1992); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, __ U.S. __ 
(1978).  States are, however, able to adopt policies that inhibit interstate commerce in waste generated within the 
state. See United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, __ U.S. __ (2007). 
163 See 49 U.S.C. §5125 (preempting state regulation of hazardous waste transportation). 
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to adopt more stringent controls on the management, treatment, and disposal of waste within its 
borders.  Such measures can be adopted without imposing discriminatory burdens on interstate 
commerce. 
 
C. Interstate Spillovers 
 
The presence of interstate spillovers, such as occur when pollution crosses state lines, 
present an unimpeachable argument for federal involvement.164  Hazardous waste management, 
disposal, and cleanup are rarely the source of such spillovers however.165  Where there is 
evidence that groundwater contamination or other environmental contamination caused by 
hazardous waste is crossing, or threatens to cross state lines, there should be recourse to the 
federal government.  This does not require the creation or maintenance of a comprehensive 
national regulatory scheme, however.  All that is necessary is a mechanism whereby a polluted 
state may seek recourse against the polluting jurisdiction. 
A potential model for a federal regulatory mechanism to control interstate spillovers of 
this sort can be found in Section 126 of the Clean Air Act.166  Under this provision, where a 
downwind state believes that it is the victim of air pollution from an upwind facility in another 
state, it may petition the EPA to regulate the upwind source directly.  Under this model, where 
there is evidence that existing waste disposal facilities or contaminated waste sites are causing, 
                                                 
164 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931 932 (1997) (“Given 
the inherent difficulties in regulation by any single state, transboundary pollution would seem to present a clear case 
for shifting regulatory authority from local to more centralized levels of governance.”).  
165 Young, supra note __, at 985 (“Although hazardous waste is a ‘nationwide’ problem in the sense that every state 
contains hazardous waste sites, it is not nationwide in the sense usually associated with environmental harms; that is, 
hazardous waste is not a problem that routinely transcends the boundaries of a single state.”).   
166 42 U.S.C. §7426. 
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or threaten to cause, contamination of water or property in another state, states would have a 
recourse under federal law.  Ideally, such a mechanism would provide affected states with a right 
to injunctive relief, in addition to compensation for harms incurred. 
 It is important to note that the federal role in such a context is not to create broad 
regulatory standards with nationwide application.  Rather, the role of the EPA in such a context 
is solely to prevent activities in one state from harming those in another state. Even where 
improper hazardous waste management and disposal causes harm in multiple states, as could 
occur where a given site pollutes a regional aquifer, this would still counsel a regional, as 
opposed to national, solution that takes into account the environmental particulars of the affected 
region.  Water pollution could permeate a regional watershed without impacting the nation as a 
whole. 
 
D. Emergency Cleanup 
 
Even those who call for reforms to allow for greater state leadership, if not complete 
control, of hazardous waste site programs acknowledge that EPA removal actions have played a 
“critical role.”167  Although states and local governments traditionally play the role of “first 
responders” in case of natural disasters and other emergencies, it appears that the federal 
government retains a comparative advantage in the provision of specialized crisis management 
functions, such as the rapid, emergency removal or containment of newly discovered hazardous 
wastes that may pose an immediate risk to human health or the environment.  Such actions have 
                                                 
167 Varney, supra note __, at 9. 
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been the most cost-effective aspect of the Superfund program from the start.168  Given the 
success of such efforts, there is a strong case for retaining federal responsibility for emergency 
cleanup and removal of hazardous materials, particularly if federal assistance can be deployed 
rapidly and efficiently to locations where quick removal actions are necessary. 
  
 
IV. TRANSITION RULES 
 
 Reorienting the respective federal and state roles in hazardous waste management 
presents a challenging transition problem.  One possible means of facilitating the transfer of 
authority from the federal to state government is to gradually phase out federal requirements over 
a defined schedule.  States that wish to assume control of hazardous waste policy within a shorter 
time frame, and seek to be free of existing federal requirements within their jurisdiction, could 
also be provided with an opportunity to petition the federal government for early relief from 
federal rules.   
Elsewhere this author has developed and described how an “ecological forbearance” 
mechanism could be used to provide states with greater flexibility and autonomy in 
environmental policy.169  This mechanism would allow states to seek greater flexibility than is 
allowed for under existing environmental laws.  Specifically, a state would have the right to file a 
petition asking the EPA to forbear enforcement of a given regulatory provision, so as to enable 
                                                 
168 DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note __, at 21 (“The major risks from hazardous waste sites have probably been 
addressed through emergency removal actions.”). 
169 See Jonathan H. Adler, Letting Fifty Flowers Bloom: Using Federalism to Spur Environmental Innovation, in 
THE JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 272-81 (Jim Chen ed., 2004).  A similar proposal was suggested in FARBER, supra note __, at 194-98. 
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the state to adopt more cost-effective or environmentally useful measures.  A forbearance 
petition would identify those rules from which a state was seeking relief and the rationale for the 
request.  The petition would be reviewed by the EPA in a public notice-and-comment 
rulemaking so as to facilitate public dialogue on the request and encourage political 
accountability.  
The ecological forbearance mechanism could be used to enhance flexibility generally, 
and could also be used to facilitate the rapid transfer of regulatory authority from the federal 
government to those states that are already in a position to take over hazardous waste policy 
concerns within their state.  States could use the process to seek greater leeway for setting 
enforcement priorities, management and disposal requirements, or cleanup standards.  In each 
case, states would be able to customize their rules to local conditions and innovate with 
experimental approaches to waste management. 
Adopting a forbearance petition process for federal hazardous waste regulations would 
not radically alter the existing regulatory environment overnight, however.  There is substantial 
inertia built into the policy-making process.  This means that such changes would likely begin 
modestly, and grow over time, with states learning from each other’s experiments and 
innovations.  In this way, actual experience could inform the ultimate contours of federal and 
state action in the area of hazardous waste. 
In the case of waste site cleanup, the federal government should refrain from adding any 
additional sites to the NPL.  Furthermore, states should be given management authority over all 
sites within their borders.  In the case of truly “orphan” sites, it may be necessary to retain a level 
of federal involvement.  There are means of transferring such sites out of federal hands as well, 
however.  For instance, the federal government could hold a “reverse auction” for such sites, 
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asking management firms to bid on how much they would need to be paid by the federal 





 Federal hazardous waste policy has become particularly wasteful and inefficient.  
Although hazardous waste problems are among the most localized of environmental concerns, 
federal hazardous waste laws are among the most centralized of federal environmental laws.  In 
order to foster greater jurisdictional matching, primary responsibility for the regulation and 
cleanup of hazardous wastes should be returned to state governments.  The federal government 
has an important role to play in hazardous waste policy, but this role requires more targeted and 
specialized efforts than the adoption and maintenance of a comprehensive cradle-to-grave 
regulatory system and a large scale waste site cleanup program that impose federal standards on 
local communities.  Through technical guidance federal agencies can inform local waste 
management and cleanup decisions without imposing uniform federal standards that fit few 
jurisdictions well. 
With federal efforts confined to those areas in which the federal government possesses a 
comparative advantage, state governments will be freed to reassume leadership in hazardous 
waste policy and tailor state policies to local needs and concerns.  This, in turn, could foster 
greater recognition of and accountability for the trade-offs inherent in hazardous waste policy, 
                                                 
170 See James V. DeLong, Privatizing Superfund: How to Clean Up Hazardous Waste, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS 247 
(Dec. 18, 1995). 
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and a more justifiable regulatory regime for hazardous waste.  Insofar as questions of hazardous 
waste policy turn on subjective preferences about risk and ecological value, they are particularly 
well suited to local control.  It is time for a hazardous waste policy devolution. 
 
 
